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Beige: Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.

SUTTON v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
THE SUPREME COURT "SUBSTANTIALLY
LIMITS" TIE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
Stephanie Beige'
I. INTRODUCTION
Twin sisters Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton shared "a
life long goal to fly for a major air carrier." 2 While employed as
commercial airline pilots for regional commuter airlines, the
sisters were denied commercial airline pilot positions with United
Air Lines, Inc. (hereinafter, "United"), after satisfying United's
basic age, education, experience, and FAA certification
qualifications. 3 The denials were based on United's policy
mandating that pilots under their employ possess uncorrected
vision of 20/100 or greater. The sisters both suffered from
uncorrected vision of 20/200 in the right eye and 20/400 in the
left eye.5 The sisters claimed United's denial of employment
based on its minimum vision requirement was in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act6 (hereinafter, "ADA"), which
prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals on
the basis of their disabilities. 7 Specifically, petitioners alleged
they were entitled to the protection of the ADA because the
respondent discriminated against them on the basis of their
disability, and the respondent "regarded" the petitioners as
having a disability. 8 The critical issue was whether the
' Stephanie Beige is a recent alumna of Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg
Law Center and was a senior staff member on the Touro Law Review. Her
paper was recognized as one of the two most outstanding papers written for
the Spring 1999 Law Review competition. Ms. Beige graduated in December
2000.
2 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 475, 476 (1999).
3Id.at 475.
4
5

id.
id.

642 U.S.C. §§12101-12213 (1994).
7Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
8

id.
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petitioners' vision should be evaluated with or without corrective
contact lenses when determining if their impairments rose to the
level of a disability. The United States district court dismissed
the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, holding that the petitioners' vision must be evaluated
with the use of corrective measures, and the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 9 Petitioners appealed to the Supreme
Court, which also affirmed. The Court held petitioners were not
covered individuals under the ADA because they were not
substantially limited in any major life activity when they used
corrective lenses, and therefore were not disabled. 10
Entitlement to the protection of the ADA requires a
showing of a "physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities."" The first
portion of Supreme Court's decision in Sutton, establishes that an
evaluation of the petitioners' vision shall be made with the use of
mitigating measures, such as corrective lenses. Prior to this
decision, the issue of mitigating measures had caused much
controversy among the circuit courts of the United States. 12
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sutton to resolve
two issues: 1) should the determination of whether an impairment
is substantially limiting be determined without regard to
corrective measures,1 3 and 2) whether the petitioners were
"regarded" by the respondent as having a disability. 14 Since the
former had resulted in a split among the circuit courts, this note
9 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15106 (D. Colo.
August 30, 1996); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 130 F.3d 893
(10th Cir. 1997).
10 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481.
" 42 U.S.C. §12102(2). Section 12102(2) provides in pertinent part that
"[t]he term 'disability' means with respect to the individual - - (A) a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such and impairment; or (C)
being regarded as having such an impairment." Id.
12 See Sutton, 130 F.3d 893; Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d
760 (6th
Cir. 1997); but see Arnold v. Untied Postal Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (1st
Cir. 1998); compare Washington v. HCA Health Serv. of Tex., Inc.; 152
F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998).
3 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481.
14Id. at 489.
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will primarily focus on the use of mitigating measures in the
determination of disability under the ADA and the impact of the
Sutton decision.
II.

RACKGROUND

One of the fundamental purposes of the ADA is to
"provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the

elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities." 1 5 However, one particular provision of the ADA
16

has proven to be less

than clear and

comprehensive.

17
Consequently, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton,

such ambiguity had caused a split in the circuits that resulted in a
varying application of the ADA. 18
The ADA, as amended in 1994, was originally enacted to
provide a level playing field for disabled persons by making it

possible for them to participate in community activities as well as
compete for employment opportunities without being unfairly
disadvantaged.1 9 Accordingly, the Act prohibits employers from
engaging in employment practices that discriminate against
individuals with disabilities. Discrimination under the ADA
encompasses not only adverse actions motivated by prejudice and
fear of disabilities, but also includes failing to make reasonable
accommodations for the disabled. 20 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (hereinafter, "EEOC") is the
15 See Kirkinburg v. Alberston's Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 1998)
(discussing the purpose of the ADA); see also Arnold v. United Postal
Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 861 (1st Cir. 1998) (explaining the purpose of
the ADA was to protect individuals with impairments who are capable of
doing a job with or without accommodations).
16 42 U.S.C. §12102(2). See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
17 Sutton, 527 U.S. 471.
"See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 893; see also supra note 12.
'9 42 U.S.C. §12112 (1994). Section 12112(a) provides in pertinent part that
"No employer may discriminate "against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions and
privileges of employment." Id.
20

See id.
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agency charged with the responsibility

of

overseeing actions arising under the ADA, and has promulgated
21
regulations including definitions in furtherance of the Act.
As a threshold issue, an individual seeking the protection22
of the ADA must suffer from a disability as defined by the Act.
The ADA defines disability as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities., 23 Conflicting interpretation of this definition had
caused disagreement among the circuit courts. Although the
regulations of the ADA adopt the EEOC's definitions of "major

life activity," 24 "substantially limits" 25 and "physical
impairment,, 26 the Act does not specify whether, when
determining if an individual's impairment substantially limits a
major life activity, the impairment should be viewed without the
21 29 C.F.R. §§1630.
22 42 U.S.C. §12102(2).

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
2 Id.
24 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(i). Section 1630.2(i) defines major life activities as
"functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." Id.
s 29 C.F.R. §1630.20)(1). Section 1630.20)(1) defines substantially limits as:
unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or (ii) is
significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which and individual can perform a particular
life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration
under which the average person in the general population can
perform the same major life activity.
Id.

29 C.F.R. §1630.2(h). Section 1630.2(h) defines physical or mental
impairment as:
Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of
the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal,
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiovascular reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary,
hemic and lymphatic, skin and endocrine; or Any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.

26
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aid of mitigating or corrective measures. 27 As a result, the
statute's inherent lack of clarity has caused the courts to decide
for themselves which approach they interpret to be most proper,
concluding with the Supreme Court and the Stilton decision.
This note discusses the split in the circuit courts
concerning the use of mitigating measures in the determination of
whether an individual is disabled under the ADA. In addition,
the author will analyze the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton
and its future impact on those who seek the protection of the
ADA.
MIT. THE VARYING
COURTS OF APPEAL

OPINIONS

OF

THE

CIRCUIT

The determination of whether mitigating measures are to
be taken into account when determining if an individual is
disabled under the ADA has been addressed by many of the
circuit courts. 28 The disagreement centered mainly on the level of

deference that should be afforded to the EEOC's Interpretive
Guidance Section 1630.20) .29 The relevant section states, "a
determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in
a major life activity must be made ... without regard to
mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic
devices." 30 The Interpretive Guidance is not a component of the

EEOC's regulations issued under the express authority of
Congress, but rather is the EEOC's own interpretation of their
rules. 31 Therefore, the circuit courts have utilized contrasting

See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 858 (stating that the statutory language is not clear
with respect to whether mitigating measures should be considered when
determining if an individual is disabled).
28 See supranote 12.
29 See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 899 (holding no special deference is given to the
27

EEOC's Interpretive Guidance); but see Taylor v. Phoenixville School Dist.,
184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999) (reiterating its prior holding that the EEOC's
interpretations should be afforded deference).
30 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j).
31 See Washington, 152 F.3d at 46 (recognizing the EEOC's Interpretive
Guidance was not promulgated pursuant to any delegated authority).
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levels of deference with regard to the EEOC's Interpretive
Guidance. 32

For example, the Tenth Circuit in Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 3 rejected the interpretation of the EEOC's
Interpretive Guidance when it addressed the issue of whether an
individual's uncorrected vision resulted in a substantial limitation
of one or more of the major life activities. 34 Afflicted with
uncorrected vision that substantially limited them in the major life
activity of seeing, the petitioners claimed to have qualified as
"individuals with a disability" within the meaning of the ADA. 35
Respondent, in opposition, argued that the petitioners' minor,
relatively common condition did not constitute a legitimate
impairment pursuant to the ADA. 36 The airline reasoned that the
petitioners were able "to function identically to individuals
37
without a similar impairment" when they wore their glasses.
Holding that the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance Section 1630.20)
directly conflicts with the language of the ADA, the Tenth
Circuit concluded it was not bound to the EEOC's definition and
In dismissing the
affirmed the district court's ruling. 38
complaint, the Court reasoned that neither petitioner was
substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing when they
used corrective lenses, and therefore neither were "disabled"
under the Act.39

The interpretation of the Tenth Circuit was followed by
only a minority of the circuit courts. Justification for this
position hinges on the express authority granted to the EEOC by
Congress. Since the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance was not
promulgated under the express authority of Congress, the
Interpretive Guidance is not entitled to the same level of
32 See supra note 29.
33 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997) cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 790.

34 Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902 (holding Section 1630.20) of the EEOC's

Interpretive Guidance is in direct conflict with the language of the ADA).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.

at 896.

"'Id. at 902.
39 Id. at

906
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deference afforded to the EEOC's regulations. 40
A court
reviewing the issue may decline to follow the Interpretive
Guidance if such rules were not found to be a permissible
construction of the ADA. 4 1 The Tenth Circuit in Sutton reasoned
that the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance Section 1630.20) was in
direct conflict with the language of the ADA which requires that
the physical or mental impairment "substantially limit" a major
life activity.42 The court reasoned that to evaluate whether an
individual was impaired without regard to mitigating measures
would effectively read out the requirement that the impairment be
"substantially limiting." 43 Therefore, if an individual uses
glasses or other corrective measures they may no longer be
substantially limited in a major life activity and should not be
considered disabled under the ADA. 44
Further justification for the Tenth Circuit's rejection of
the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance is that Section 1630.20) is
inconsistent with other statements found in the Interpretive
Guidance. 45 For example, the court noted that the determination
of whether an individual has a disability is not based only on the
name or diagnosis of the impairment, but rather on the effect of
that impairment on the life of the individual. 46 In the court's
view, the actual effect on the individual is important, not the
underlying condition. 47 Therefore, the impairment should be
evaluated with the aid of corrective measures.
This interpretation was also followed by the Sixth Circuit,
when it addressed the issue of whether 'an individual who
40 See
41

Washington, 152 F.3d at 46.

See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 864.

See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902 (holding that a determination of whether an
individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity should take
into consideration mitigating or corrective measures utilized by the individual).
43
1 d. at 9o1.
44Id. at 902.
45 Id. (asserting that the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance in discussing
"substantially limits" does not attempt a "laundry list" of impairments that are
to be considered "disabilities," indicating that some impairments may be
disabling for some individuals and not for others).
42

46Id.
47id.

41 Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902.
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suffered from non-insulin dependent diabetes, was disabled under
the ADA.49 In Gilday v. Mecosta County the plaintiff, an
emergency medical technician, sued his employer claiming that
his diabetes constituted a disability and he was not reasonably
accommodated with respect to his disability. 50 Although the
court remanded the case for further proceedings, the majority
opinion delivered by Judge Kennedy stated that the EEOC's rule
on mitigating circumstances conflicted with the text of the ADA
51
and therefore was not a permissible construction of the statute.
The majority reasoned that the acceptance of the EEOC's
Interpretive Guidance Section 1630.2() would allow an
individual to be considered disabled even if such a person were
not substantially limited in a major life activity with the benefit of
medication. 52 Since the court found the statutory text to be clear
as to the term "substantially limits," it declined to review the vast
legislative history supporting the EEOC's position.53 In addition,
the court concluded that the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance
Section 1630.2(0) was inconsistent with the section of the
EEOC's regulations concerning "disability.", 54 The relevant
section generally states that when making a determination of
whether an individual is substantially limited, an individualized
comparison to an average person in the general population must
be made. 55 However, the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance Section
1630.20) does not require such a comparison. 56 The court
reasoned that the negation of such a comparison may result in the
creation of "substantial limitations" in cases where none might
49 See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997).
50 Id.

51Id. at 766 (holding that the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance conflicts with the
statutory requirement under the ADA that a disability "substantially limit" one
or more of an individual's major life activities).
52 Id.
at 767.
53 Id. (recognizing that the legislative history lends some support to the
EEOC's position, the court nevertheless held the statutory text was
unambiguous and it was therefore unnecessary to consult the legislative
history).
14 Id. at 767.
"
29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j). See surpa note 25.
56
See Gilday, 124 F.3d at 767.
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exist. 57 The court further supported its rejection of the EEOC's
Interpretive Guidance by noting that the purpose of the ADA was
not to provide protection for just anyone with a physical or
mental impairment, but rather only for those persons with
impairments which substantially limit an individual's life. 58
Therefore, it could not have been the intent of Congress to
protect individuals whose life activities would only hypothetically
limited were they to stop taking their
be substantially
59
medications.
Similarly, in Cline v. Fort Howard Corp.,60 the U.S.
district court determined that an employee's nearsightedness and
difficulties with peripheral vision did not substantially limit the
major life activities of seeing or working. 61 The court reviewed
decisions from other jurisdictions involving ADA claims based
on vision impairments and noted that in the area of vision a more
with regard
efficient approach would be to evaluate the limitation
62
to the use and effectiveness of corrective devices.
However, the First Circuit in Arnold v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.,63 held that the ADA protects individuals based on
their underlying disability without regard to whether some of the
limitations are ameliorated by the use of medication or other
treatment. 64 The Arnold case involved a job applicant who
alleged that he was not hired by the United Parcel Service, Inc.,
because of his disability, diabetes mellitus, in violation of the
ADA. 65 The district court dismissed the claim because the
plaintiff had successfully controlled his diabetes with the use of
5 id.
58 Id. (determining that Congress did not intend the ADA to protect as

"disabled" all individuals whose life activities would hypothetically be
substantially limited, were they to stop taking medication).
59 id.

60 963 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Okla. 1997).

Cline, 963 F. Supp. at 1081.
at 1080 (evaluating the current theme running through visual impairment
cases as a finding that a visual impairment which hinders, or makes it more
difficult to function at full visual capacity does not amount to a substantial
limitation on one's ability to see).
63 136 F.3d 854 (lst Cir. 1998).
64
136 F.3d at 866.
65 Arnold,
Id. at 857.
61

62 Id.
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insulin for twenty-five years and, as a result, was not
substantially limited in any major life activity.66 The First
Circuit reversed the dismissal, basing its decision on legislative
history in determining the intent of Congress when enacting the
ADA.67 The Arnold court acknowledged that the statutory
language is less than clear with respect to whether an individual's
impairment should be viewed in his untreated condition or his
condition after treatment with mitigating measures. 6s The court
reasoned that when the statute itself is unclear courts should defer
to the interpretation utilized by the agency charged with
enforcement of the statute. 69 Such deference should be afforded
as long as the interpretation "flows rationally from a permissible
construction of the statute.",70 Beginning with a review of the
legislative history, the court concluded that both the language and
illustrative examples included in the ADA's legislative history
made it clear that Congress intended the analysis to be made on
the basis of the underlying condition without considering the
ameliorative effects of medication, prostheses, or other mitigating
measures. 71 The court noted that the House and Senate
Committee reports explicitly stated that a determination of
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity
should be assessed without the consideration of the mitigating
measures. 72 When interpreting statutory construction, the courts
must interpret the language of the statute taking into

66 Id.
67 Id. at 859 (holding that the ADA's legislative history makes it abundantly
clear that Congress intended the analysis of an impairment and the question of
whether it substantially limits a major life activity to be made on the basis of
the underlying condition).
61 Id. at 858.
69 Id.
70

Amold, 136 F.3d at 858.

71 Id. at 859.
72 Id. at 860

(citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) determining whether
an individual has a disability within the scope of ADA coverage "should be
assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as
reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids").
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73
consideration the purposes Congress sought to serve.
Consequently, the court further noted that the ADA is a broad
remedial statute and it would be more consistent with its goals to
interpret the words "individual with a disability" broadly so that
the Act's coverage would protect a larger segment of society
from the effects of discrimination. 74 The First Circuit also noted
the policy reasons favoring the EEOC's position.75 If an
individual's impairment were to be evaluated on the basis of any
corrective measures, those who could not afford such treatment
would be protected by the ADA from discrimination in hiring.76
Accordingly, once an individual was hired and received health
care benefits, the individual would lose such protection.77
Similarly, the ADA would treat differently two individuals with
the same impairment, by distinguishing between one who takes
medication and one who does not. 78 The court found this result
to be inconsistent with the remedial goal of the statute. 79 For
example, the court noted that an individual who has taken
corrective measures and has successfully mitigated the effects of
his impairment is precisely the type of individual the statute seeks
If an individual is otherwise qualified for the
to protect.8 0
position, his or her disability cannot be a factor in the hiring
process.8 1 The court reviewed the EEOC's interpretation and
found it to be entirely consistent with the ADA's legislative
history and broad remedial purpose.8 2 In addition, the court

73 Id. at 861 (noting that in cases of statutory construction, the courts must

interpret the words of the statute in light of the purposes Congress sought to
serve).
74 Id. at 861 (noting that even with such a broad view of 'disability' the

concerns and interests of employers are still protected through the Act's other
provisions).
75
Id. at 863.
76

Arnol, 136 F.3d at 863.
7nId. at 862.
78

ld"

79 id.

so Id.at 862 (noting that plaintiff was prevented from obtaining a commercial
license because he had diabetes, with no consideration of the fact hat he had
controlled his diabetes, and therefore was entitled to an accommodation).
81

Id.
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noted that the EEOC's interpretation was virtually identical to
that of the United States Department of Justice, which was
charged with enforcing the ADA's prohibition of discrimination
based on disability on the part of state and local government
entities. 3
Similarly, in Harris v. H&W Contracting Co., 84 the
Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff suffering from the
impairment Graves' disease should be evaluated in the absence of
any mitigating measures, such as medication. 5 The Eleventh
Circuit's analysis mirrored the analysis set forth by the First
Circuit in Arnold, reviewing both the legislative history of the
ADA and the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance.86
Interestingly, there has been an assertion of a third view
in addition to those set forth in Sutton and Arnold. This
interpretation was set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Washington v.
HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc.8 7 The court held that the
question of whether an individual's impairment should be
evaluated without regard to mitigating measures depends on the
nature of the impairment and should be determined on a case-bycase basis .s8 At issue in Washington was whether an individual
suffering from Adult Sills Disease, but who was able to control
the effects of the disease through medication was substantially
limited in a major life activity.89 Similar to the First Circuit in
Arnold, the Washington court reviewed the EEOC's Interpretive
Guidance and the legislative history of the ADA to determine if
Arnold, 136 F.3d at 864 (holding that the EEOC's interpretation is not
merely 'permissible,' it is entirely consistent with the ADA's legislative
history and broad remedial purposes).
83 Id. at 864 (noting that the reasonableness of the EEOC's interpretation is
bolstered by an identical interpretation by the U.S. Department of Justice).
84 102 F.3d 516 (llth Cir. 1997).
82

8"Id.

at 524.

Id. at 521 (holding that there was no direct conflict between
interpretation contained in the EEOC guidelines and the language of
statute).
87 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998).
88 Washington, 152 F.3d at 470 (holding that only serious impairments
ailments that are analogous to those mentioned in the EEOC Guidelines
the legislative history will be considered in their unmitigated state).
'9 Id. at 466.
86
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mitigating measures should be taken into account when
evaluating an impairment. 90 The court decided that the Tenth
Circuit's reading of the ADA in Sutton was the most
reasonable. 91 Therefore, acknowledging that the legislative
history and the EEOC could not be ignored, the court
alternatively held that they could be read narrowly. 92 The court
recognized that there was nothing in the EEOC's Interpretive
Guidance or the legislative history that suggested that all
impairments be considered in their unmitigated states or that
mitigating measures never be taken into account. 93 Accordingly,
the Fifth Circuit held that only serious impairments analogous to
those mentioned in the EEOC's Guidance should be considered in
their unmitigated states. 9 4 The court addressed the requirements

for these impairments, holding that such impairments must be
serious in common parlance, requiring the individual to use
mitigating measures on a frequent basis, and those mitigating
measures must be continuous and recurring. 95 If mitigating
measures amount 96
to permanent corrections, they may be taken
into consideration.

IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
THE ADA, AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS
The judicial dissent between the circuit courts concluded
on June 22, 1999 -with the Supreme Court decision denying ADA
coverage to the petitioners in Sutton. 97 The Supreme Court
decided both issues raised by petitioners: 1) should the
90 Id.

at 476 (stating that the EEOC's interpretation is consistent with much of
the legislative history of the ADA).
91 Id. at 469 (stating that the court is not unsympathetic to the reasoning set
forth by the minority of the circuit courts, that mitigating measures must be
taken
into account).
92
id.

93rd
"

94 Washington, 152 F.3d at 470.
95 M.

96 Id. at 471 (holding that mitigating measures that amount to permanent
corrections or ameliorations may be taken into account).
97
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
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determination of whether an individual is disabled be made with
reference to mitigating measures, and 2) whether the petitioners
were regarded as "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA. 98
In connection with the first and most important issue, the
Supreme Court held that the effects of corrective measures, both
positive and negative, must be taken into account when
determining whether a person is "substantially limited" in a
major life activity and therefore disabled under the ADA. 99 The
Court did not decide this issue on the basis of the persuasive
force of the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance, as disputed by the
circuit courts, but rather, by viewing three separate provisions of
the Act itself. 100

The Court began by analyzing the language used in the
Act to define "disability." 101 The Court noted that the phrase
"substantially limits" appears in the present indicative form, and
therefore requires an individual to be presently disabled, rather
than hypothetically or potentially disabled. 0 2 Accordingly, an
individual who suffers from a physical or mental impairment may
not be substantially limited when his condition is treated with
mitigating measures.
The second provision relied on by the Court also concerns
the definition of "disability" under the Act. Specifically, the
Court noted that the ADA requires that "disabilities be evaluated
'with respect to the individual' and be determined based on
whether an impairment substantially limits the 'major life

98

Id. at 475.

99 Id. at 482.

'0o Id. The majority noted that Justice Stevens came to the opposite conclusion
in his dissent by relying on the legislative history of the ADA. Id. at 482.
The majority further stated that they had no need to consider the legislative
history since the terms of the ADA precluded such an interpretation. Id.
101Id. at 482. The Court noted that the Act defines disability as a "physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities." Id.
102 Id. (reasoning that "a 'disability' exists only where an impairment
'substantially limits' a major life activity, not where it 'might,' 'could,' or
'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.")
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activities of such individual.'' 0 3 The majority concluded that
the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance runs directly counter to this
individualized inquiry.'14 The Court held that the individualized
approach called for by the Act prevents the disabled from being
judged on the basis of group characteristics, which would be
"contrary to both the letter and spirit of the ADA."O'I

Justice

Stevens in his dissent strongly disagreed with the majority
interpretation. 10 6 Specifically, Justice Stevens noted that viewing
an impairment in its unmitigated state would still comply with the
individualized inquiry under the Act. 0 7 Justice Stevens argued
that limitations of similar impairments in their unmitigated states
differ in each individual depending on the severity of the
condition and the physical and personal characteristics of the
individual.'0 8
Lastly, the Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to
include all uncorrected conditions in the definition of disability
by focusing on the findings of Congress when enacting the
ADA.' 0 9 Specifically, the Court pointed to the Congressional
finding that some forty-three million (43,000,000) Americans
have one or more physical or mental disabilities." 1 Based on a
report by the National Council on Disability issued in 1988, the
estimated number of disabled Americans was approximately one103

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483; see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998),

wherein the Court held that the determination of whether a person has a

disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry. Id.
'04

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483.

The EEOC would require individuals to be

evaluated in their unmitigated state. This would result in generalizations of
certain disabilities and their limitations, without an inquiry into how that
disability actually affects each individual. Id.
'05 Id. Further, the Court noted that the individualized approach would also
allow employers and courts to consider negative side effects suffered by
mitigating measures. Such a consideration would be precluded by the EEOC's
Interpretive Guidance. Id.
' 6 Id. at 508 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted "The Court's
mantra regarding the Act's 'individualized approach,' however fails to support
its
holding." Id.
'0 7 Id. at 509 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1o8id.
'09 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 486.
"Old.; see also 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(1).
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hundred sixty million (160,000,000) under what is known as the
"health conditions approach."' 1 '
The 'health conditions
approach' looks at, "all conditions that impair the health or
normal functional abilities of an individual."112 Accordingly, the
Court held that if Congress had intended individuals with
corrected impairments to be covered by the Act, they would have13
cited a much larger number of disabled persons in the findings. 1
However, Justice Stevens in his dissent came to the
opposite conclusion, basing his decision on customary tools of
statutory construction." 4 Although Congress may not have
foreseen that it's definition of "disability" might encompass a far
larger number of individuals than originally estimated, in order to
be faithful to the remedial purpose of the ADA, the definition
should be given a generous construction. 115 Justice Stevens
argued that the forty-three million cited by Congress was not
intended to by a cap on the Act's protected class." 6 Moreover,
the dissent noted that eight of the nine circuit courts that had
addressed the issue, and all three of the executive agencies that
had issued regulations in furtherance of the ADA, concluded that
the definition of "disability" 7 required an evaluation of the
individual's unmitigated state.1
Justice Stevens centered his position on the entire
definition of disability under the ADA." 8 The definition
consisted of three overlapping provisions, which the dissent
...
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 485.
112Id.
3
11
Id.

114 Id.
115

at 487.
at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

id.

Id. at 511-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that Congress
would not have included the "regarded as" or "record of" categories in the
definition of disability if they did not intend to cover those who lack "actual
disabilities." Id.
"7 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 502 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent notes the
116

EEOC, The Department of Justice and the Department of Transportation have
all adopted the same definition of "disability." Id. All three agencies share

the view that the determination of whether an individual is substantially limited
in a major life activity must be made without regard to mitigating measures.
Id.
'18Id. at 497-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/16

16

Beige: Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.

2000

SUTTON V. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

1457

argued were "aimed at ensuring that individuals who now have,
or ever had a substantially limiting impairment are covered by
the Act." 119 Specifically, Justice Stevens noted that Subsection
(B) of the definition, which states that an individual is covered
under the Act if "there is a record of such impairment," would
be unnecessary if determinations are to be made on the
Subsection (B)
individual's present, mitigated state. 120
specifically protects a class of individuals that were at one time
disabled, but for some reason are no longer. 12' The majority
position that only the person's actual, current impairment status
be relevant is inconsistent with subsection (B) of the Act.12
Moreover, the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County
v. Arline previously held that a similar section of the
Rehabilitation Act, the predecessor to the ADA, covered a person
who previously had a serious hearing impairment but had since
been completely cured. 123 Because the definition of "disability"
under the Rehabilitation Act is virtually identical to that in the
ADA, 124 Justice Stevens concluded that under the majority's
holding in Sutton, fully cured impairments were covered by the
Act, while merely treatable ones were not.' 2S That result,
have been the intent of
Stevens argued, surely could not
26
ADA.'
the
enacting
when
Congress

119 Id. Justice Stevens refers to the three provisions set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§12102(2). See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
12 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 498 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting if the drafters
intended to exclude past impairments that are no longer substantially limiting,
they would not have included "a record of having such an impairment" in the
definition of disability).
121
122 Id.

id.

'23 School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). The issue
was whether an individual was considered handicapped under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. at 275. The Rehabilitation Act was the
predecessor to the ADA and the definition of disability under the ADA is
"almost verbatim" from the Rehabilitation Act. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 497
(citing 29 U.S.C. §706(8)(B); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998)).
'24 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 497-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'2' Id. at 498.
126

Id.
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Rather than adopting the majority position that the
definition of disability under the statute is limited to the present
status of the impairment, the dissent argued that read together,
the three subsections of the Act "inquire into the existence of an
impairment - present or past - that substantially limits, or did so
limit, the individual before amelioration." 27 In coming to this
conclusion, the dissent relied on the legislative history and
concluded that both the Senate Report on the bill and the House
of Representatives Report indicated the intent of Congress not1 to
28
include mitigating measures when evaluating impairments.
Justice Stevens further argued that respect should be accorded to
the three executive agencies charged with implementing the Act,
all of which mandate the unmitigated state is the basis for

disability determinations. 129
Lastly, Justice Stevens referred to prior decisions in
which the Court has interpreted anti-discrimination statutes when
certain classes of individuals or types of discrimination fell
outside the core prohibitions of the statute. 130 In these situations
the Court expanded the coverage of the remedial statutes even
when the type of discrimination was not the principle evil
127

Id. at 499.

128 Id. at 499-500 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the authoritative source
for finding the legislatures intent is the Committee Reports on the bill).
129 Id. at 502-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance,
the Department of Justice and the Department of Transportation have all taken
the position that the determination of whether and individual is disabled should
be made without regard to mitigating measures. Id.
130 Id. at 505-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens referred to two
particular statutes the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and more recently Title VII in connection with
same-sex sexual harassment. Id. Justice Steven noted that although the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was enacted primarily in response to Congress' desire to
prohibit discrimination against African-Americans the Court held it would be
unreasonable to narrow its coverage and deny its protection to HispanicAmericans or Asian-Americans. Id. Justice Stevens noted the Supreme Court
decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998),
where the Court expanded the coverage of Title VII to cover same-sex sexual
harassment cases. Id. Justice Stevens pointed out that "the statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principles
of our legislators by which we are governed." Id. at 79, 80.
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31
Congress was concerned with when enacting the statute.'

Justice Stevens argued that the same statutory interpretation
should be applied to the definition of disability,32 thereby
expanding the ADA's coverage rather than limiting it.'
The last issue before the Court concerned the third
situation in which "disability" is defined by the ADA, when 33
a

person is regarded as having a disability by an employer.'

Petitioners alleged that respondent had mistakenly regarded them
as having a disability which substantially limited them in the
major life activity of working. 134 The Court quickly dispensed
with the petitioners' argument that the respondent's vision
requirement substantially limited their ability to engage in the

major life activity of working by precluding them from obtaining
the job of a global airline pilot.135 The Court held that when the

major life activity is that of working, the petitioners must allege
that they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs, and global
airline pilot is not such a class. 136 Since global airline pilot is a
...
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 506 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Steven argues that the nature of visual

impairments should be judged by the same standard as any other medically
controllable
condition. Id.
133 Id. at 492 (citing 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)).
'3 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. The petitioners alleged one of the two ways in
which the "regarded as" situation arises. The second situation is when "a
covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, non-limiting impairment
substantially limits one or more major life activities." Id. The Court further
declined to decide whether working is major life activity on account of the
petitioners having failed to allege their claim adequately. Id. at 492.
13s Id. at 490-91. The Court stressed that the ADA allows employers to prefer
certain physical characteristics over others to make sure that the job candidate
is best suited for the job. Id. Further, the Court noted, the employer "is just
as free to decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments
make individuals less than ideally suited for a job." Id.
136 Id. at 491. The Court reasoned that the "substantially limits" language
requires that the job be a broad class of jobs rather than a single job. Id. The
Court additionally cited to the EEOC and it's definition of the term
"substantially limits" when referring to the major life activity of working.
Id.; 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(3)(i) provides in pertinent part:
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as
compared to the average person having comparable training,
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single job, the allegation that the petitioners' poor vision was
regarded by the respondent as substantially limiting
them in the
37
1
unsupported.
was
working
of
major life activity
The Sutton decision has had an immediate impact on
individuals suffering from impairments, seeking accommodations
from their employers. An illustration is the recent decision of the
Third Circuit in Taylor v. Phoenixville School District.' The
Taylor case concerned a school employee who sued her former
employer under the ADA alleging that her former employer
failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations for her
mental illness. 1 39 The district court dismissed the complaint
reasoning that the plaintiff's illness, bipolar disorder and/or
manic depression, although an impairment under the ADA, did
not substantially limit one of her major life activities. 14 0 The
Third Circuit, upon an extensive review of the legislative history
relating to the ADA, reversed the district court's dismissal on
April 5, 1999, finding that the plaintiff was substantially limited
in the major life activities of caring for herself, thinking, and
interacting with others when viewed in her unmedicated state. 141
This decision however, was vacated on August 19,
1999 in light
42
1
Sutton.
in
determination
Court's
Supreme
the
of
Although vacating their prior opinion, the Third Circuit,
applying Sutton, again reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment.1 43 The court concluded that although the
skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single,
particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in
the major life activity of working.
Id.

Id. at 493. The Court also denied the petitioners' claim that if a substantial
number of airline carriers had the same vision restrictions they would be
substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Id. at 493-94. The
Court reasoned that employers are permitted to have valid job requirements
regardless of how many employers adopted similar restrictions. Id.
138 184 F.3d. 296 (3d Cir. 1999).
137

'

39

140
141

Id. at 301.
Id. at 301-02.
Id. at 302.

Taylor v. Phoenixville School Dist., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19572 (3d
Cir. 1999).
143 Taylor, 184 F.3d. at 302.
142
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plaintiff's disability had to be viewed in her mitigated state, there
were genuine issues of fact regarding whether the plaintiff's
bipolar disorder substantially limited a major life activity while
she was taking lithium.44 The plaintiff in Taylor claimed that
although she had been able to reduce the risk of serious psychotic
episodes with the aid of lithium, the drug had not perfectly
controlled her symptoms, leaving her still substantially limited in
her ability to think.1 45 The court held that drug side effects can
be important in determining whether someone is disabled and
found that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to
require a trial on the issue of whether she continued to be
substantially limited while taking medication. 46 This decision
however, is of limited benefit to those seeking protection of the
ADA. It is only in the exceptional cases that corrective measures
themselves will substantially limit major life activities, leaving
the majority of individuals unprotected.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision, which disqualifies
individuals who have taken efforts to correct or mitigate their
disabilities to the extent that they are no longer substantially
limited in any major life activities, will leave unprotected the
class of individuals the ADA was enacted to protect. 47 The
majority supported its position with the present indicative form of
the language in subsection (A) of. the Act's definition of
disability. 148 However, in doing so, the Court ignores the
language used in subsection (B) and (C), which directly refer to
Id.
144
145 Id. at 308.

Id. at 309 (noting that the Supreme Court has held that drug side effects
can be important in evaluating disability).
47
' Id. at 509 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority decision "would seem to
allow an employer to refuse to hire every person who has epilepsy or diabetes
that
is controlled by medication." Id.
48Id.
at 482-83. The majority state "because the phrase 'substantially limits'
appears in the Act in the present indicative form, we think the language is
properly read as requiring that person be presently - not potentially or
hypothetically - substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability." Id.
146
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past impairments. 149 The Court further concluded that the
Congressional finding in 1988 that forty-three million Americans
suffered from disabilities is a basis for denying coverage to those
whom otherwise would be protected. 150 Justice Stevens in his
dissent, cited to the Brief for the United States and EEOC as
Amicus Curiae, which stated, "it is quite wrong for the Court to
confine the coverage of the Act simply because an interpretation
of 'disability' that adheres to Congress' method of defining the
class it intended to benefit may also provide protection for
'significantly larger numbers' of individuals than estimated in the
Act's findings."' 5'
Although generally persuasive, these arguments are
lacking in light of the legislative history and remedial purposes of
the ADA. When faced with the two alternatives -- allowing the

ADA to cover a larger scope of the population than Congress
intended, or limiting the Act's coverage so that some who should
be entitled are not -- the former is the more desirable approach.

The fear which accompanies the expansion of the definition to
cover those with trivial or minor impairments is unfounded. The
protection of the ADA merely forbids an employer from
discriminating on the basis of stereotype or fear.1 52 The
individual still must establish the employer has no legitimate
explanation for not hiring him or her. 153 The ADA by its terms
allows employers to establish physical criteria as long as it is
necessary for the job requirements.' 54
Accordingly, the
protection afforded by the ADA will not force employers to hire
those who are truly not qualified due to their impairment, and
will not result in the always feared 'floodgate of litigation.'
The Sutton decision will have a chilling effect on the
disabled who have taken efforts to become active members of
society. The Supreme Court has essentially taken away coverage
149

See supra note 11.

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484-85.
151 Id. at 504 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
So

152 Id.

Id.
Id. at 490. "Under the EEOC's regulations an employer may make
employment decisions based on physical characteristics." Id.
153

154
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from the very individuals the ADA was enacted to protect.
These very individuals can now be discriminated against by
employers without fear of prosecution under the ADA.
Ironically, the petitioners in Sutton were disqualified from job
positions because of their unmitigated vision impairment, yet
denied coverage under the ADA based on their mitigated
condition.
This surely could not have been the intent of
Congress when seeking to prevent employers from discriminating
against those who are otherwise qualified for a job position
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